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Abstract
Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that
regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their
propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in par-
ticular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors.
In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote
on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple
norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of
group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions.
1 Introduction
In May 2009, the elected members of the French Assemblee Nationale (French Par-
liament) voted a law imposing sanctions for those among them not attending weekly
meetings of committees. Even without sanctions, some officials would have attended,
driven by an individual sense of duty or a concern for the image the group has of
them. Sanctions nevertheless significantly increased attendance: from an average of
7 meetings attended per year, it jumped to 19 meetings. Moreover there appeared
to be a systematic link between the way parliamentaries voted on sanctions and the
way they behaved after that.
Similarly, most members of groups and organizations (firms, NGOs, academic
departments...) choose the rules that govern their interactions, in particular those
regulating tasks with group externalities, such as attending meetings, writing reports
or participating in team work. One important driver of contributions to common
tasks are image concerns, i.e caring about how the group perceives you. For instance
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Ariely et. al. (2009) show that efforts made to contribute to a good cause are much
higher when individuals are observed by others.
In such contexts, we study how group members vote on rules and subsequently
behave. There is a close interaction between voting behavior and contribution deci-
sions. A sanction, by increasing overall contributions, will decrease the honor that
can be derived from individually contributing. Thus voting affects the calculus of
reputation. In turn, when votes are public, concern for image will affect voting
behavior. Uncovering the subtle interactions inherent in these environments is the
object of this paper.
Specifically, we study a model that includes two stages involving the same group
of players. In the second stage players simultaneously choose whether to contribute
to a public good. In the first stage, the same players vote on a given sanction s to be
imposed in the second stage to non contributors. Group members are heterogenous
in their intrinsic propensity to contribute, what we call their type, but all members
want the group to perceive them as having a high type. These inferences made by
the group are based on observed actions. We consider several types of situations.
In the first, the vote is secret and the action observed by others is the contribution
decision. In the second, only the vote is public and the inferences of others are based
exclusively on voting behavior. Finally we consider the case where both are public.
In the public good contribution stage, three categories of members emerge.
Those with a high type, called always-participants, contribute regardless of whether
the sanction was voted or not. Those with a low type, called never-participants,
never contribute. Finally those with intermediate values, called swing-participants,
contribute if and only if the sanction was voted.
Consider first the case where the vote is secret. In the voting phase, the members
of these three groups will have different incentives. We first show the surprising
result that it can be a dominant strategy for always participants to vote against the
sanction, even though the sanction will never apply to them. Indeed, even though
these members gain from a sanction because other group members increase their
contribution and thus impose a positive externality, they however lose in reputation
as taking the action is no longer so rare that it signals a high intrinsic value. If
the sensitivity to reputation is sufficiently high, these members will vote against the
sanction.
If the externality gain is big enough they will however vote in favor. Furthermore
we show that, in spite of the very different motivations of the three categories of
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members, always participants always have higher incentives to vote in favor than
the swing participants who themselves have higher incentives than the never par-
ticipants. We thus find that the equilibrium in pure and symmetric strategies is
of the cutoff form where members vote for the sanction if and only if their type is
above a cutoff value V ∗. We show that there can exist several equilibria, that can be
interpreted as corresponding to different norms of behavior: some with a high V ∗,
i.e groups tending to vote against sanctions because the gain in additional public
good is expected to be low and those with a low V ∗ more likely to vote for sanctions
as they expect higher benefits.
Technically, the multiplicity is linked to the information aggregated when voters
consider the case where their vote is pivotal. The gain from a sanction comes
from the additional public good provided in the second stage. The only types that
change their actions depending on the sanction are the swing participants. Thus,
to evaluate the benefit of the sanction, individuals need to estimate the number
of swing participants in the group. We find that the information aggregated on
the proportion of swing participants in the group can generate the multiplicity of
equilibria mentioned above.
We derive policy implications, restricting our attention to cases where there is
a unique stable equilibrium. We show that the effect of increasing sanctions on the
outcome of the vote can go in both directions depending on parameters. This reflects
a tradeoff similar to the one mentioned above. Higher sanctions will mean a higher
expected externality gain, but at the same time a reduced payoff from reputation
since the act becomes more banal. We also show that the supermajority required
for approval of the law has a surprising effect on the vote outcome. Increasing the
required supermajority can decrease the voting cutoff and even overall make approval
more likely even though more votes in favor are required for approval. Finally
we show that the manager of the organization wanting to maximize contributions
often has an incentive to publicly disclose contributions in the second phase: it
always increases contributions since members care about their image, but also often
increases the probability that the sanction is adopted in the first stage.
We then turn to the case where the individual votes are public, but the con-
tributions are kept secret. There is then a reputation payoff attached to the vote
(regardless of whether the member is pivotal or not) that has to be traded off against
the probability of being pivotal. We find that the voting equilibrium is again char-
acterized by a cutoff, since the members with a higher type have more to gain from
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the sanction. We show also that as the size of the group increases, sanctions will
tend to be approved regardless of their size: the probability of being pivotal goes to
zero and the only motivation that remains is to vote in the way sanctioned by the
social norm.
We finally examine the case where both votes and contributions are observable.
We show that the equilibrium is no longer necessarily of the cutoff type, given that
the members now have two ways of signalling their type. It is possible that low types
vote against and don’t contribute, intermediate types vote for and don’t contribute
while high types vote against and contribute.
Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) is the paper closest to ours. They examine a public
good problem, very similar to the second stage of our model, and show how the
calculus of honor and stigma can be derived. Their key focus is on how an informed
principal can optimally set incentives. They also examine the case where the choice
of the principal reveals information about the societies values. We take a different
stance and examine instances where the rules are endogenously determined by the
group, not set by a principal. Such situations are of high practical relevance and
furthermore lead to subtle theoretical interactions. We show how the law can shape
the calculus of honor and how in turn social norms can influence voting. We derive
surprising predictions on the effect of different institutional features.
There is in fact quite a large experimental literature examining the difference
between exogenously and endogenously set sanctions on future behavior. Part of
the literature (Galbiati and Vertova 2008 and Galbiati et al. 2013) examines the
case where the designer who decides on the sanction is informed, contrary to our
setting, which relates to the expressive nature of the law that motivates Be´nabou
and Tirole (2011). Tyran and Feld (2006) consider an experimental setting closer
to our model and show that if the group votes for the sanction (rather than have a
sanction exogenously imposed), it is followed by higher contributions. We return to
that evidence in the conclusion.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on strategic voting and informa-
tion aggregation in voting, where the initial motivation was to revisit the Condorcet
jury theorem when including strategic concerns (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996,
Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1997, 1998). To the best of our knowledge, in all
the papers in this literature, the benefits of the law submitted to a vote is exoge-
nously given (but not publicly observed). In our public good setting, the benefit of
the sanction is endogenously determined by how voters react to it. This leads to a
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multiplicity of equilibria not present in the rest of the literature.1
There is also a growing literature on aggregation of information in committees
which is related to our analysis of public voting in section 5. In many of these
papers, voters experience a given disutility if their vote indicates they had bad
information. For instance in Midjord et al. (2013), privately informed agents vote
on an approval decision and get a negative reputation payoff (of fixed value) if the
outcome is to approve and the state was in fact bad. They show that this will lead
the committee to be overly cautious and in the limit when the size is large, will
lead to sure rejection. This relates to our result in the case of public voting, where
we show that for large organizations sanctions are always adopted, except that in
our case the reputation payoff is endogenously determined. Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2001) include a similar concern for appearing well informed in a model where voters
express themselves sequentially.
Godefroy and Perez-Richet (2013), consider a sequence of two votes in a com-
mittee with privately informed voters, the first to select the issue to be submitted
to a vote and a second to vote on approval of this issue versus status quo. They
focus on the effect of the supermajority requirement in the selection stage on voting
behavior and show that a more conservative rule implies more conservative voting
behavior. Similarly, in section 4.2, we show that in our very different setting, the
supermajority requirement in the first stage can have surprising implications on
voting behavior due to information aggregation properties, but the mechanics of
information aggregation are quite different. In fact, in our setting we find that a
more stringent rule can make voters more inclined to vote for the sanction. Even
more surprisingly, a more conservative rule can make overall approval more likely.
One of the key elements of the model is the fact that individuals care about the
image others have of them, what has been coined image concerns. Many papers, in
the lab or in the field, establish empirically the importance of these image concerns.
Ariely et. al. (2009) for instance compare effort levels in treatments that varied in
three dimensions: subjects were either observed or unobserved, received monetary
incentives or not and contributed either to a “good cause” (Red Cross) or a “bad
one” (NRA). They find that being observed increased effort levels only when subjects
did not receive monetary incentives or when they volunteered for a good cause.
1One exception is Callander (2008) who examines a model where privately informed voter want
to elect the best candidate but also want to vote for the winner. The source of multiplicity is very
different: if the rest of the group is more likely to vote against their signal, it also makes sense to
do so as there is a desire to be on the winning side.
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Della Vigna et al. (2012) show that notifying residents in advance of the exact
time of sollicitation in a door to door fundraiser significantly decreases the share of
households opening doors, one possible interpretation being that image concerned
individuals attempt to avoid the pressure.2
There is also extensive laboratary experiment. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) find
that contributions in a public goods game increased when the players were not
anonymous. Dana et al. (2006) offer participants a costly option to opt out of a
dictator game and show that giving in the dictator game is in part motivated by
participants not wanting to appear selfish. In the same spirit, other contributions
(Rege and Telle 2004, Sanek and Sheremeta 2013), find that providing options for
the participants to overcome their moral dilemmas significantly lowers transfers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model, in
section 3 we derive results for the case of a secret vote but an observable contribution,
and discuss robustness in the case of bonuses or complementarities in public good
production. We draw implications in section 4. In sections 5 and 6, we examine
instances where individual votes are publicly revealed. Finally we discuss empirical
implications in section 7 and conclude.
2 Model
We consider a two stage game involving 2N + 1 players. In the first stage, a rule (or
law in certain contexts) is submitted to a vote. The rule specifies a sanction s > 0
that will be imposed in case of free riding in the public good stage that will follow.
Note that the case of a bonus for contributing would lead to very similar results
(discussed in section 3.3.1). However for notational simplicity we focus for most of
the results on a positive sanction.
All players cast their vote simultaneously. The voting decision of individual i
is denoted bi ∈ {0, 1} (where b stands for ballot). If strictly more than K voters
vote in favor, the law is adopted. For most of the paper we will consider the case
of majority rule, i.e K = N . The outcome of the vote is publicly revealed and the
players then simultaneously decide, in a second stage of the game, on a public good
contribution ai, where ai ∈ {0, 1}.
2Henry and Sonntag (2015) propose an experimental game to measure individual sensitivity to
image concerns and show that image concerned individuals often try to avoid situation where their
reputation is at risk. Note that there are also instances where image concerns don’t seem to play
a role, such as in Gill et al (2015).
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For a given approved sanction s and a given vector of contributions to the public
good a = {a1, a2, ..., a2N+1}, the utility of player i is given by:





Individual i gets an intrinsic benefit of contributing to the public good denoted
vi, which will characterize the type of the individual. There is also a cost of contri-
bution c common to the whole population. If a sanction is in place, there will be an
additional cost for those not contributing s(1− ai).3 In addition, there is an exter-
nality gain derived from the contributions of others e
∑
j 6=i aj
2N . We consider in section
3.3.2 the case where the production of the public good involves complementarities
Finally, the utility contains a less standard term, µE[vi|yi] (as in Be´nabou and
Tirole 2011), which corresponds to a reputation concern. The reputation is based
on an observed individual choice yi by player i. We will consider three cases. First,
the case where the vote is secret but the contribution is observable, i.e yi = ai, an
environment we call public contributions. This is in fact the main focus of the paper.
Second, the case where individual votes are revealed but the individual contributions
are kept secret, i.e yi = bi, what we call public vote. Finally we consider the case
where both votes and contributions are publicly revealed yi = (ai, bi), what we call
both public.4 All cases can be relevant in practice. The agents can value reputation
per se because they care about the perception others have of them, or this reputation
might have future financial consequences not explicitly specified in the model.
Actions reveal information on the underlying value of vi, the intrinsic motivation
of each agent. Individuals privately observes their vi, what we will call their type.
Specifically vi are i.i.d. drawn from the distribution of types f(v) with support
[vmin, vmax], continuously differentiable with f(v) > 0. The reputation term E[vi|yi]
is thus the expected value of vi given action yi using the distribution of types f .
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3From the point of view of group members, the sanctions is a pure loss, in particular is not
redistributed to the group. We did not want to add this extra consideration that would make our
message less clear.
4We also consider in section 4.3 the situation all secret
5Note that we assume that the expectation is taken with respect to the prior distribution f . As
in Levy (2007), information could in fact be obtained about individual votes from the aggregate
result of the vote. The voters could thus update their belief about the type distribution. This
would significantly complicate the resolution and increase the multiplicity of equilibria. We thus
assume that the expectation is conditioned only on individual actions. It appears to us to be a
reasonable assumption for this term which in any case is a behavioral component of the utility
function: other members do not use the aggregate result to base their belief about individual types
when the individual actions are so salient.
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The timing of the game is thus the following:
1. Types are drawn and privately observed
2. Players vote on the rule with no abstention. The outcome of the vote is
publicly revealed
3. Players then simultaneously decide on their contribution decision.
We focus on symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria (where players with the same
type choose the same strategy).
3 Voting on sanctions: secret votes
We first consider situations where individual votes are secret, but the contributions
are publicly observed. In most organizations and for most public goods, the contri-
bution is directly observable (for instance participation to meetings, preparation of
reports...). The organization might however have in place secret voting. This is the
type of situations we first consider, the public contributions environment.
3.1 Contribution stage
In the second stage, all players observe whether the sanction was voted or not and
decide on their contribution to the public good. For a given sanction s (where s = 0
corresponds to the case where voters turned down the sanction), contributing yields
intrinsic benefits and costs as well as the honor of doing the right thing:
vi − c+ µE[vi|a = 1]
Not contributing on the contrary exposes individual i to a sanction and to the stigma
of not contributing:
−s+ µE[vi|a = 0]
As in Be´nabou and Tirole (2011), the unique equilibrium is a cutoff equilibrium
where all individual with type above v∗s contribute, where the cutoff v∗s is character-
ized by:
v∗s = c− s− µ4(v∗s)
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with4(vs) = E[v|v > vs]−E[v|v < vs]. As described in Be´nabou and Tirole (2011),
the condition 1 + µ4′(v) > 0 guarantees the unicity of the equilibrium. Overall, we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 If 1 + µ4′(v) > 0, in the contribution stage after a sanction s has
been voted, the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium is such that players
contribute if and only if they are of type vi higher than a cutoff v
∗
s defined by
v∗s = c− s− µ4(v∗s) (1)
The cutoff is increasing in c, decreasing in s and µ.
The cutoff is increasing in c, as a more costly contribution reduces the incentives
to participate. The cutoff also decreases with the visibility of contribution (or taste
of agents for reputation) µ since more pressure worsens the impact the stigma at-
tached to free-riding and thus provides incentives to contribute. Finally, the voting
cutoff is decreasing in s as a higher sanction raises the material cost of free-riding.
3.2 Voting stage
In the first stage, players have to vote whether to approve or not a given sanction
s. If there is a majority of votes in favor, sanction s is implemented and the players
use in the contribution phase a strategy with cutoff v∗s , as derived above. On the
contrary if a majority votes against the sanction, the players use in equilibrium a
strategy with cutoff denoted v∗0. Proposition 1 implies that v∗s < v∗0.
Given the behavior in the public good stage, and for a given value of s, agents
can be grouped in three categories:
• The never-participants who do not contribute regardless of the outcome of the
vote: agents with vi < v
∗
s .
• The swing-participants who contribute if and only if the sanction is voted:
agents with v∗s ≤ vi ≤ v∗0.
• The always-participants who always contribute regardless of the outcome of
the vote: agents with vi > v
∗
0.
These different types of individuals have different motivations in voting. One
common factor is that they all benefit from a positive externality if the sanction is
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voted, coming from a higher contribution of the other players in the second stage.
Secondly, for the never participants, they can anticipate that if the sanction is
implemented it will directly decrease their payoff since they will need to pay the
sanction.
There is a third effect that is a key factor in voting: whether a sanction is voted
or not will shape social norms. For those who always contribute, a sanction will
decrease the honor they derive from doing the right thing since more types will
tend to contribute in equilibrium. On the contrary, for the never participants, a
sanction increases the stigma attached to not contributing. We now uncover how
these different effects interact.
Consider the always participants (i.e players with vi > v
∗
0). By definition of this
group, the outcome of the vote will not affect their own behavior, since regardless of
their particular type vi they will participate. When considering their voting decision,
they thus simply tradeoff the externality gain that a sanction would bring against
the decrease in the reputation payoff they obtain from doing an honorable act. It
turns out that if e is low enough, the second effect dominates and they actually have
an incentive to vote against the sanction.
Proposition 2 For any sanction s, there exists a value e(s) such that if e < e(s), it
is a weakly dominant strategy for the always-participants to vote against the sanction.
We obtain the surprising result that individuals who in any case contribute to the
public good, have an incentive to vote against a sanction that would force the others
to participate as well. This is the case if the loss in reputation dominates the gains
from increased contributions of the rest of the group. From a policy perspective
this result is important. Note that even if the conditions for Proposition 2 are not
met, the fact that this group always suffers from a loss of reputation if the sanction
is passed, means that they have fewer incentives to lobby for regulation than what
could be expected at first sight.6
However, when e is larger, the always participants do have an incentive to vote
in favor. We now examine more in details the incentives of the different types to
vote for or against the sanction, to determine which group is most likely to support
the sanction. The never participants do not change their contribution decision even
6In our model there is of course no lobbying phase or stage where players can exert effort to
influence legislation. If we added such a stage, the always-participants might have in fact little
incentive to lobby for the regulation.
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if the sanction is in place. However a sanction will mean a loss in reputation from
the increased stigma of not contributing (µ(E[vi|vi < v∗s ] − E[vi|vi < v∗0], which is
negative since v∗s < v∗0), on top of the financial cost s. They however benefit from
the expected externality gain obtained if the sanction is approved that we denote
G. This externality gain is the difference between the externality obtained with a
sanction and that obtained without. Overall, we find that for the never participants,
the difference in expected utility comparing the situation with a sanction to the one
without, that we denote D(vi), is given by:
D(vi) = µ (E[vi|vi < v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗0])︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputation loss <0
−s+G (2)
For the always participants, as explained above, they suffer a loss of reputation that
they need to tradeoff against the externality gain. Note that in equilibrium, the
expected externality is the same for all types, and is equal to G as for the never
participants. We explain later in detail how this measure is derived. For the always
participants we have
D(vi) = µ (E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi > v∗0])︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputation loss <0
+G (3)
Finally, for the swing participants, the decision involves an additional consideration.
By definition swing participants contribute if and only if the sanction is in place.
Therefore the actual type vi will play a role. For this group we find:
D(vi) = µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗0]) + vi − c+G (4)
We see that for all types, the difference in utilities D(vi) expressed in conditions
2-4 can be written as D(vi) ≡ R(vi)+G, where R(vi) is the difference in reputation
cost and in direct financial costs, between the case with a sanction and the case
without. Note that R(vi) will always be negative.
What group has the most incentives to vote in favor of the sanction? the answer
is not straightforward. Consider for instance the comparison between the never and
always participants. It could a priori be the case that the loss in reputation for the
always-participants be greater than for the never participants. This would be the
case if 4(v) was increasing in v, what Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) describe as the
case of strategic complements. We however show that in equilibrium, even if that
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were the case, the difference in reputation could not be greater than s.
Lemma 1 In all symmetric perfect bayesian equilibria:
• If some of the never participants vote in favor of the sanction then all the
swing participants and always participants vote in favor.
• If some of the swing participants vote in favor of the sanction, then all the
always participants vote in favor.
• If a swing participant of type vi votes in favor of the sanction, then all swing
participants with type v′i > vi vote in favor.
Lemma 1 reflects the fact that the function R(vi) is weakly decreasing in vi.
Types with a higher vi have a relatively lower cost of having the sanction accepted.
In Figure 1 we plot −R(vi). The function −R(vi) is flat for always and never
participants and strictly decreasing for swing participants.
The result of Proposition 1, strongly suggests that symmetric perfect bayesian
equilibria should be of the cutoff form, i.e equilibria characterized by a cutoff V ∗
such that a type votes in favor if and only if vi ≥ V ∗. This is in fact correct only with
a small additional constraint. Indeed there can exist other types of equilibria, due to
the fact that all never participants (resp. always participants) face the same tradeoff
in voting regardless of their particular type vi. Without further constraints, there
could therefore exist equilibria where all never participants are indifferent between
voting in favor or against, some vote in favor and others against (and all swing and
always participants vote in favor). In such an equilibrium the identity of those never
participants who vote against is not a priori uniquely pinned down.7 We thus impose
the following additional restriction that states that if two types are indifferent in
their voting decision then, if the lower type votes in favor, so does the higher type.
Restriction A (tie breaking): If in equilibrium two types vi > v
′
i are indif-
ferent between voting in favor or against the sanction, then if type v
′
i votes in favor,
so does type vi.
Note that restriction A, which appears minimal, could be rephrased differently:
it would be equivalent to assume that a vote for the sanction gives an additional
7The specific types of never participants that vote against can be chosen freely under the con-
straint that the condition of indifference between voting for and against is indeed satisfied.
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benefit proportional to the type, vi, with  very small, and this independently of
the behavior in the second phase. When we impose Restriction A, we find:
Proposition 3 Under Restriction A,
• All symmetric perfect bayesian equilibria are cutoff equilibria, characterized by
a cutoff V ∗.
• There is at most one equilibrium where the cutoff belongs to the never partic-
ipants group (resp. always participant group), i.e V ∗ < v∗s (resp V ∗ > v∗0).
Proposition 3 establishes that, under Restriction A, all symmetric perfect bayesian
equilibria are of the cutoff form. It also shows that even with this restriction, there
potentially remains a multiplicity of equilibria. This multiplicity however has a nice
economic interpretation that we develop below.
To understand better the intuition of these results, we have to understand what
determines the value of the expected externality gain G, which is of course deter-
mined in equilibrium. For a given equilibrium with cutoff V ∗, G takes a unique
value, identical for all groups. However, this value G is not necessarily monotonic
in V ∗.
As in the literature on information aggregation in voting (Austen-Smith and
Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1997 and 1998), voters consider only
the case where their vote is pivotal. In equilibrium the voter can infer additional
information about the distribution of types. In the simple majority voting case, a
player is pivotal when there are exactly N yes-voters and N no-voters among the
2N other players. Recall however that to determine the expected externality gain
from having a sanction, each voter only needs to determine the expected number of
swing participants. Indeed they are the only types that change behavior based on
whether the sanction is approved or not and they thus determine the added value
of having a sanction in place.
Consider the case where the cutoff is among the never participants, i.e V ∗ ≤ v∗s .
In this case, the no-voters are necessarily never participants, while some of the yes-
voters are going to be swing participants. In fact this proportion is the expected
probability of being a swing participant F (v∗0) − F (v∗s) conditional on being a yes








F (v∗0)− F (v∗s)
1− F (V ∗)
]
This expected externality is strictly increasing in V ∗: indeed, if the cutoff is higher,
it becomes more likely that the yes voters are indeed swing participants. This implies
the result in Proposition 3 that there can be only one equilibrium in this zone (since
R(vi) is flat in this zone as illustrated in Figure 1).
If the cutoff is in the swing participant group, the calculation of G is slightly
more intricate. No-voters can in this case either be swing participants or never
participants. Specifically, given a voting cutoff V ∗, the probability that a no voter is
a swing participant is given by F (V
∗)−F (v∗s )
F (V ∗) . As V
∗ increases, it becomes more likely
that a no voter is in fact a swing participant. On the other hand, the probability
that a yes voter is a swing participant (and not an always participant), is given by
F (v∗0)−F (V ∗)
1−F (V ∗) . As V
∗ increases, it becomes less likely that the yes voter is a swing
participant. Overall, the expected externality gain is thus given by the following
expression:
G(V ∗) = 12e
[(





F (v∗0)−F (V ∗)
1−F (V ∗)
)]
The effect of an increase in V ∗ on the expected externality gain is ambiguous
when V ∗ belongs to the swing participant group. As V ∗ increases, it becomes more
likely that no voters are swing participants but less likely for yes voters, leading
to an ambiguous conclusion on the expected number of swing participants, and
thus on the size of the externality. This fact leads to the surprising feature that
there could be multiple equilibria with V ∗ ∈ (v∗s , v∗0), i.e the cutoff is among the
swing-participants. We call equilibria in this zone interior equilibria.
We illustrate this in Figure 1. We plot both the decreasing function −R(vi) and
the function G(V ∗) for the case where f is uniform.8 There are two equilibria with
cutoffs V1 and V2 that corresponds to the intersection of function −R(vi) and the
function G(V ∗). Indeed the cutoff is characterized by the fact that the cutoff type
V ∗ is such that R(V ∗)+G(V ∗) = 0. In equilibrium with cutoff V1, the pivotal voter
expects a large portion of yes voters (to the left of V1) and of no voters (to the right
of V1) to be swing participants. The expected externality is thus large and justifies
8Note that the x axis is vi for R and V ∗ for G.
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibria
the low voting cutoff. On the contrary in the case of V2, it is very unlikely that the
yes voters are swing participants, the expected externality is thus lower, justifying
the higher cutoff.9
These different equilibria can be understood as corresponding to different norms
of voting. A norm of opposition to sanctions (high cutoff) might prevail and would
be based on an expectation of low externality gain. There could also exist norms of
voting more favorable to sanctions (lower cutoff) based on an expectation of a high
externality gain. Both these norms would be self sustained due to the mechanisms
of information aggregation described above.
Figure 1 shows a case with two equilibria but the multiplicity can be larger in
general. We present below conditions (satisfied in the case of the uniform distribu-
tion presented in Figure 1), where this multiplicity is reduced.




• there are at most two symmetric perfect bayesian equilibria
• there is a unique stable interior equilibrium
9This outcome with multiple equilibria is an interesting feature of our model and, to the best of
our knowledge, is not present in the literature on aggregation of information in voting. Consider
the classic case where voters get information on an underlying state of the world and the expected
payoff is increasing in this state. The type of a voter is the signal he obtains, and like in our model
the equilibrium will take the form of a cutoff strategy. In this case, the expected payoff is increasing
in the cutoff: a higher cutoff means the information obtained when pivotal indicates a higher state
of the world. In our model there can be non monotonicities as suggested above.
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The conditions f1−F (v) is weakly increasing and
f
F (v) is weakly decreasing, guar-
antee that the externality gain G(V ∗) is a weakly concave function on the interval
(v∗s , v∗0). Thus there can be at most two equilibria. Furthermore, an interior equi-
librium (defined above as V ∗ ∈ (v∗s , v∗0)) is stable if and only if G(V ) is increasing
at the equilibrium cutoff.
3.3 Robustness
We discuss briefly the robustness of our results to some extensions.
3.3.1 Case of bonuses
Our main model focuses on sanctions for free riding. Naturally, a bonus b for
contributions gives very similar results. In the contribution stage, the three same
categories will emerge as in Proposition 1, with the cutoff v∗0 unchanged and a cutoff
v∗b < v
∗
0 in the case with a bonus.
The results of Proposition 2 would still hold, to the extent that we constrained
the bonus not to be too large.10 The result then appears even more forceful: for
moderate bonuses, it can be a dominant strategy for group members who would
obtain this bonus to vote against the rule implementing them as they might lose too
much in reputation. Finally results of Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 would hold and
the voting stage would be characterized by a voting cutoff. To preserve the clarity
of the presentation, we keep studying, for the rest of the text, the case of sanctions.
3.3.2 Complementarities in public good provision
We considered up till now environments where there were no complementarities
between the different individual contributions to the public good. We now briefly
show that the results extend to the case of complementarities. Complementarities
should be common, in the case of team work for instance. We assume that for
given vector of contributions a, the level of the public good is given by g(ai, a−i)
with g supermodular in the case of strategic complements and g submodular for
substitutes. The utility of agent i is given by:
Ui = (vi − c)ai − s(1− ai) + eg(ai, a−i) + µE[vi|yi]
10Indeed very large bonuses would dominate the loss in reputation.
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In this case we show in Appendix B1 that both the contribution and voting
behaviors are still characterized by cutoffs. The determination of the cutoffs is
more involved in particular because the result of the vote in the first stage provides
information on how cooperative the group is and thus affects contributions in the
second stage because of complementarities.
4 Changing environments
In this section, we examine how changes in the regulatory environment affects voting
and contributions. The designer (leader/manager of the organisation for instance),
can affect the level of the sanction s and potentially the details of the voting rule.
We return to our main model with no complementarities and focus on environments
where the conditions of Proposition 4 hold.
4.1 Changing the level of sanction s
We first examine how the level of s will affect the outcome of the vote. In the
public good phase, the level of s will affect the equilibrium size of the groups. As s
increases, more never participants become swing participants, i.e as s increases v∗s
decreases.11 This will of course affect indirectly the equilibrium of the voting stage.
In the voting stage, there will be two effects. First, the expected size of the
externality increases since the size of the swing participant group increases with
s. However there is a countervailing second effect which is the loss in reputation.
These two effects go in opposite directions. The first effect, i.e the externality effect,
increases the incentives to vote in favor, while the second, the reputation effect,
decreases it. Since the first is proportional to e and the second is proportional to µ,
we find the following result:
Proposition 5 There exists a benchmark b(s) such that in the unique stable equi-
librium, the voting cutoff in equilibrium V ∗ is decreasing in the level of sanction s
if and only if eµ > b(s).
Increasing the sanction can increase the propensity to vote in favor if the exter-
nality effect dominates the loss of reputation, i.e e is large compared to µ. If this
11Note however that v∗0 is not affected, i.e the size of the group of always participants is not
changed.
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is not the case, the effect will be reversed. This information is key for a designer
wanting to minimize the sanction conditional on approval.
4.2 Voting rule
Another important feature of the voting process is the supermajority chosen for the
voting rule. Up till now we have considered the case of majority rule. We now
consider institutions that use different rules and require strictly more than K votes
in favor to approve the sanction.
The required majority does not impact the contribution stage or the general
structure of the equilibrium in the voting phase. It however affects the information
aggregated when an individual is pivotal. We find that this rule has a surprising
effect on the outcome of the vote.
Proposition 6 There exists V̂ ∈ (v∗s , v∗0) such that, in all stable equilibria, the
voting cutoff V ∗ is
• decreasing in K if V ∗ ≤ V̂
• increasing in K if V ∗ ≥ V̂
Consider an equilibrium such that V ∗ < v∗s , in other words the pivotal voter is a
never-participant. This pivotal voter, to calculate the expected externality, needs to
build an expectation on the number of swing participants. Only the yes-voters can
be swing participants in such an equilibrium. As K is increased, the number of yes
voters is higher when pivotal and thus the expected size of the externality is higher,
which makes the pivotal voter more inclined to vote in favor (i.e V ∗ decreases). In
this case a more stringent voting rule, namely an increase in the supermajority rule,
makes people more inclined to vote in favor.
In fact there are instances where increasing the supermajority rule can increase
the probability of approval. We present such a case in Appendix B2 for a uniform
distribution. We thus get the surprising outcome where increasing the number of
votes necessary for approval can in fact facilitate approval.
4.3 Keep contributions secret?
The designer in certain instances might have the option to keep the individual
contributions secret in the second phase. We examine in this section what are her
incentives to do so, if her objective is to maximize contributions.
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We first have to derive the equilibrium when both votes and contributions are
kept secret, an environment we call both secret. To clarify the comparisons, we focus
on the case where types are uniformly distributed over (0, 1). In the public good
stage members use higher cutoffs than when contributions are public, vˆs = c−s > v∗s
and vˆ0 = c > v
∗
0. The fact that they no longer suffer from bad reputation when
they do not contribute decreases overall contributions. This would suggest that
the designer would want to make contributions public. However, we still need to
verify that keeping them secret would not make members more inclined to vote for
the sanction (supposing the designer can find ways to commit to keep individual
contributions secret in the second phase). We thus examine the voting stage.
In the voting stage, the tradeoff is very similar to the one expressed above: the
voters will tradeoff the cost of contributing (that we denote −R̂(vi)) against the
expected externality gain Ĝ(vi). The functions −R, −R̂, G and Ĝ are plotted
in Figure 4. The financial and reputational cost is higher for always and never
participants to vote in favor in the public contributions environment compared to
the both secret (i.e at the extremities, for v < v∗s or v > vˆ0, −R is above −R̂).
Consider for instance the case of never participants: by voting in favor they will not
only incur the financial cost s but will also suffer from the increased bad reputation,
a concern not present when contributions are kept secret. For the intermediate zone,
and in particular in the zone of swing-participants for both (i.e V ∈ (vˆs, v0)),12 the
cost is higher in the both secret environment. Indeed image concerns make swing
participants more inclined to vote in favor as they benefit from the good reputation
of contributing when the sanction is passed.
We now compare the expected externality gains G and Ĝ. We see a pattern
emerge in Figure 4. For low values of V < v∗s , where types are never participants in
both cases, G(V ) = Ĝ(V ), and similarly for high values V > vˆ0. Then for V slightly
above v∗s , G(V ) starts increasing faster, as some of the no voters can now be swing
participants in the secret vote environment. It eventually decreases as V approaches
v∗0, while Ĝ(V ) starts increasing. We find that in the uniform case, there is a single
intersection between the two curves. This feature turns out to be more general as
shown in the following result.





V < 12 , G(V ) ≥ Ĝ(V ) and if V > 12 , G(V ) ≤ Ĝ(V )








Figure 2: Comparing the cases both secret and public contributions
We can now conclude on whether the designer who wants to maximize contri-
butions should commit to keep contributions secret in the second stage. In Figure
4 we illustrate a case where V ∗ < V̂ . In this case, the designer should clearly not
commit: in the first phase members are more inclined to vote in favor of a sanction
and in the second stage they are more likely to contribute. We provide in the next
proposition general conditions for this pattern to emerge.





exists el and eh, such that if e ∈ (el, eh), the sanction is more likely to be adopted
under public votes than under both secret, i.e V ∗ < V˜ .
5 Public voting
We now consider the public vote environments, i.e situations where the individual
votes are public but the contribution decisions are not observed by the group mem-
bers. This could be the case if the individual contribution to the public good are
hard to identify, which is often the case when it is the outcome of team work. Of
course, to impose the sanctions, the designer/manager will have to observe individ-
ual actions. We thus consider cases where he commits or is unable to credibly make
the actions public. Note that in the case of bonuses in firms, which is typically a
reward corresponding to a team work, individual bonuses are not revealed to other
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members. There can exist in groups resistance to the public disclosure of sanctions
or bonuses.
In these cases, the reputation of individuals will therefore be based on their
votes.13 In the contribution phase, given a sanction s, individual i contributes if
and only if vi > c− s. As in the previous sections, there will be three categories in
equilibrium, always participants, swing participants and never participants. How-
ever the cutoffs between these categories do not include a reputation component
anymore: v∗0 = c and v∗s = c− s.
The voter cares not only about the event where his vote is pivotal, but also about
the other events since his vote will always be observed, and other players will make
inferences on his type based on it. All voters care in the same way about reputation,
so would vote the same way if they knew they were not pivotal. However, in the
pivotal case, those with lower vi will have higher incentives to vote against the
sanction.
We denote Piv the event of being pivotal when voting and 4∗ ≡ E[vi|bi =
1] − E[vi|bi = 0] the reputation derived in equilibrium from voting in favor of the
sanction rather than against. Both these measures are determined in equilibrium
and do not depend on the individual types of players.
In equilibrium, the net benefit of the never participants to vote in favor of the
sanction is given by:
µ4∗ + P [Piv] (−s+G)
for swing participants
µ4∗ + P [Piv] (vi − c+G)
and for always participants
µ4∗ + P [Piv] (G)
where G is the expected externality gain from the sanction, conditional on the event
of being pivotal.
As in the environments studied in the previous sections, under Restriction A, all
symmetric perfect bayesian equilibria are of the cutoff form.
13We consider the case of majority voting.
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Lemma 3 Under Restriction A, all symmetric perfect bayesian equilibria are cutoff
equilibria, characterized by a cutoff V ∗.
Lemma 3 reveals that under the same minor restriction as before, all symmetric
equilibria are of the cutoff form. As in the case of observable actions and unobserv-
able votes, the problem is characterized by a large multiplicity of equilibria. One of
the reasons is non-monotonicities in the expected externality gain G as a function
of V ∗, as in the case of public contributions. There are however in this setting
additional sources of multiplicity.
The first is due to the reputation term 4∗. Given that we are faced with cutoff
equilibria, this term can be written 4∗ = E[vi|vi > V ∗] − E[vi|vi < V ∗] ≡ 4(V ∗).
As described in detail in Benabou and Tirole and in Jewitt, the function 4(V ) is
not necessarily montonic. These nonmontonicities are the first source of additional
mutliplicity of equilibria.
The second is more interesting and is present even when we abstract from the
externality effect. Consider the case where e = 0. For a given N , the probability
of being pivotal is not monotonous in V ∗. For V ∗ lower than the median, the
probability of being pivotal is increasing in V ∗ while it is decreasing otherwise.
There could thus be two potential equilibria: one where V ∗ is low and one where
it is close to 1/2. In the first case, players have high incentives to vote in favor
because the probability of being pivotal is low and the reputation effect dominates,
thus justifying the low V ∗. This is a self sustaining norm of general support for
sanctions, self sustained because the chance of pivotal is small if everyone votes
in the same way. In the second equilibrium (different norm), players have more
incentives to vote against (higher V ∗) as this higher V ∗ is coherent with a higher
probability of being pivotal.
We have shown that the key tradeoff in the case of public voting is between the
reputation derived from voting in favor and the effect of the vote on the outcome in
the event the vote is pivotal. It is thus natural to ask the question of what occurs
for large organizations when the chance of being pivotal decreases. We find that
any level of sanction will be adopted in equilibrium for large assemblies. We need
to focus on sequential equilibria to eliminate the unreasonable equilibrium where
everyone votes against the sanction and the belief, off the equilibrium path when
someone votes in favor, is that the deviator has a very low type (i.e 4∗ < 0).14
14such an equilibrium is not sequential since if voting in favor happens with some probability on
22
Proposition 8 If ∆(V ∗) is decreasing in V ∗, then an increase in the size of the
organization N will decrease the probability of acceptance.
However, when N → +∞, in all sequential equilibria of the game where only
votes are observable, any sanction s > 0 is approved with probability converging to
one.
The intuition when N becomes very large is quite clear. Low types vote against
the sanction when the probability of being pivotal is high enough that it compensates
for the loss of reputation. When N becomes large, the probability of being pivotal
goes to zero and the proportion of people ready to vote against shrinks. Note
that this is independent of the level of the sanction and in particular, it could well
be the case that the sanction decreases total welfare. This result generalizes the
result of Feddersen, Gailmard and Sandroni (2009) who consider the case where one
alternative is exogenously given as the ethical outcome.
The first result of Proposition 8 however shows that this is only a limit result,
and in a sense qualifies the finding of Feddersen, Gailmard and Sandroni (2009).
Increasing N can actually decrease the probability of acceptance of the sanction in
the case where 4(V ) is a decreasing function at V ∗.
6 Observing votes and contributions
In small committees it is often the case that the contribution decision is observable,
or as discussed in the previous section, that the designer is unable or unwilling to
keep the contributions secret. Therefore, if the institutional choice was to choose
public voting, the inferences made by other group members about an individual’s
type, will be based both on her vote and contribution choices.
To clarify the forces at play, we focus on the case where the sanction s submitted
to a vote is large, s > vmin− c, so that if the sanction is voted, all types participate.
Consider the case where the sanction was not voted in the first stage of the game.
The behavior of the players will depend on the way they voted in the first phase.
Conditional on a vote, the players will choose a cutoff strategy. We denote the cutoff
v0(1) for the players who voted in favor of the sanction in the first phase and v0(0)
for those who voted against.
the equilibrium path, then given that the incentives to vote in favor are increasing in the type, the
reputation 4∗ attached to a yes-vote should necessarily be positive.
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Using the notation E0(b, a) = E [vi|(bi = b) ∩ (ai = a) ∩ (s = 0)] (for instance
E0(1, 0) is the expected value of v given that the player voted for the sanction, the
sanction was not passed and he did not participate), the cutoff is defined by
v0(i) = c− µ [E0[i, 1]− E0[i, 0]]
There is no clear ordering between v0(0) and v0(1). On the one hand, those who
already sent a bad signal by voting against the sanction, might have little to lose
by not participating. On the other hand, those who already voted for the sanction,
can afford to send a bad signal of not participating. The ranking will depend on
inferences made in equilibrium.
Proposition 9 In the voting phase:
1. There exist equilibria where v0(0) < v0(1) and others where the ordering is
reversed
2. The equilibrium voting strategy is not necessarily a cutoff strategy. In partic-
ular there exists an equilibrium with two cutoffs v and v such that:
• for v < v, players vote against the sanction and do not participate, i.e
choose (0,0)
• for v ≤ v ≤ v, players vote for the sanction and do not participate (1,0)
• for v > v, players vote against the sanction and participate (0,1)
Proposition 9 presents properties of equilibria such that certain types vote in
favor of the sanction and some against. The full set of equilibria is described in
the proof. The first key property is that the voting strategy is not necessarily of
the cutoff form. In particular there is an equilibrium where low types vote against
and do not participate, intermediate types vote for and do not participate and high
types vote against and participate. In this equilibrium, the low types do not want
to vote in favor because contributing is too costly and they consider the case where
their vote can be pivotal. The intermediate types are ready to take the risk of voting
in favor and potentially losing if pivotal, to benefit from the increased reputation.
They however do not want to deviate to action (0,1) since contributing is still too
costly.
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7 Discussion and examples
We conclude by discussing potential avenues for testing empirically our results, both
with field and lab data, and incidentally give some further exemples of applications
of our setup.
We first return to the case, mentioned in the introduction, of the French Assem-
blee Nationale voting a law imposing sanctions for not attending.15 Following the
vote and the introduction of the sanction, participation significantly increased: from
an average of 7 meetings attended per year, it jumped to 19 meetings. There was
however a large heterogeneity in reactions. Some people still did not participate.
The maximum fine imposed was 4615 euros for someone failing to attend a single
meeting.
This setting with elected members of parliament voting on rules that regulate
their activity appears to be a very good environment to test our theoretical re-
sults. Data is available: for instance we can observe both voting and contribution
behaviors. Furthermore, the level of observability evolved. Initially in 2010, the
members did not expect their presence to be publicly revealed, but an independent
association, called Regards Citoyens, decided to make public the information. The
participation behavior can thus initially be considered as partially secret since the
parliamentaries were not aware that the data would be published.
There are however several specific features that we need to highlight. First,
there is a tendency, particular strong in France, for parliamentaries to follow party
lines, making it harder to identify individual decisions. Second, the members of
parliament do not care only about their image within the group, but also in the eyes
of their electorate.16
Even though there is strong party discipline, we code a party member abstaining
or not coming to vote as someone voting against the party line. For instance in this
particular case, the right wing party (UMP) called to vote in favor of the proposal,
while the left called to vote against. We consider those UMP members who did not
vote as voting against the proposal.17 Among the top 7 shirkers in 2010, 3 voted
against the sanction and out of the four UMP ranking in the top 7, three were not
15If they missed more than 2 sessions per month, their compensation for these meetings would
be reduced by 25 percent (representing more or less 353 euros).
16Both these dimensions are compatible with our preference structure.
17In fact, the final result turned out to be quite close, with 312 voting in favor when a majority
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Figure 3: Attendance and voting on sanctions
present on voting day.
We can go further and examine the link between voting behavior and attendance
in the general assembly. This is presented in Figure 3. We see a clearly increasing
trend indicating that those with a higher vi are more likely to vote against the
sanction, consistent with our result that equilibria will be of the cutoff form.
This exemple suggests one possible avenue for testing some of our results. Ideally
data could also be obtained from the functioning of smaller groups where the image
concern would only be relevant within the group (whereas politicians care also about
the image their constituents have of them). A different direction would be to use
experimental data.18
In fact our paper can inform some of the existing experimental evidence in the
literature, in particular the results in Tyran and Feld (2006). The authors examine
a two stage game very similar to ours, involving 3 players. The second stage is
a public good provision game. In some treatments a sanction for free riding is
exogenously imposed, while in others it is voted by the group. We focus on the
results they obtain in the mild sanction case, i.e a sanction that would not deter a
purely rational player from free riding.
The authors show that contributions in the public good games are significantly
higher following a sanction endogenously chosen versus exogenously set. They sug-
gest one explanation based on selection: if participants vary in their generosity (i.e
our vi), those cases where the sanction is adopted are cases where the group is
18There are now new procedures to measure individual sensitivity to image concerns.
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overall more generous. They discard this explanation based on the following two
additional results.19 Yes and no voters contribute more or less in the same way in
the public good game that follows. Yes and no voters contribute significantly less if
the sanction is not imposed than if it is imposed. The authors claim that if selection
was an issue, yes voters should contribute the same regardless of whether they are
in a group that accepted vs rejected the sanction.
Our analysis suggests a more nuanced view. Consider the case where most
subjects in the lab are swing participants. If that were the case, by definition of
swing participants, they would behave differently if the group adopted or rejected
the sanction. Moreover, both yes and no voter if they are swing participants, even
though they vote differently, would behave in the same way later on. The two facts
mentioned above are thus not incompatible with selection. However, if most sub-
jects are actually swing participants, we should not observe a significant difference
between exogenous and endogenous sanctions, which might point to the fact that
additional forces as those proposed by Tyran and Feld might be at play, includ-
ing conditional cooperation. Understanding how this modifications of preferences
affects our results, could be the object of interesting future work.
19Shown in Table 3 of their paper.
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As derived in the main text, the contribution cutoff for a given sanction s is
given by:
v∗s = c− s− µ4(v∗s)
with 4(vs) ≡ E[v|v > vs]− E[v|v < vs].
Let F (v) = µ4(v) + v − c+ s. The equation characterizing v∗s can be rewritten
F (v∗s) = 0. Furthermore, we have F ′(v) = 1 + µ4′(v). Thus, the condition 1 +
µ4′(v) > 0 guarantees the unicity of the equilibrium as in Be´nabou and Tirole
(2011).


















Denoting Gs the expected externality obtained if the sanction is approved and
G0 the expected externality obtained if the sanction is not approved, we denote
G = Gs − G0 as in the main text, the expected externality gain from sanctions,
which is the same for all players regardless of their type.
The expected payoff of always participants if the sanction is approved is:
vi − c+ µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]) +Gs
If it is rejected:
vi − c+ µ(E[vi|vi > v∗0]) +G0
The difference between the payoffs is thus:
D(vi) = µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi > v∗0]) +G (5)
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D(vi) is independent of the particular value of vi and furthermore we have E[vi|vi >
v∗s ] − E[vi|vi > v∗0] < 0 since v∗s < v∗0. In other words, more players participate
following the sanction so there is less value of reputation from participating.
The maximum value for G is achieved when all other players contribute if and
only if the sanction is passed, i.e Gs = G = e and G0 = 0. Therefore, rewriting
equation (5) using the fact established above that G ≤ e, we have:
D(vi) ≤ µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi > v∗0]) + e
For a given s, define e(s) as:
e(s) = −µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi > v∗0])
We thus conclude that for all e ≤ e(s) it is a best response for the always participants
to vote against the sanction, even if the externality gain is at its maximum. We thus
conclude that for e ≤ e(s), voting for the sanction is a weakly dominated strategy.
Lemma 1
As derived in the main text, in equilibrium, never participants vote in favor of
the sanction if and only if:
µ(E[vi|vi < v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗0]) +G− s ≥ 0 (6)
swing participants vote in favor if and only if:
µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗0]) +G+ vi − c ≥ 0 (7)
and always participants vote in favor if and only if:
µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi > v∗0]) +G ≥ 0 (8)
Taking the difference between the left-hand side of condition (7) and (6), we find
that this difference equals:
µ (E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗s ]) + vi − c+ s
= µ4(v∗s) + vi − c+ s
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Since vi corresponds to the type of swing-participants, we have vi ≥ v∗s and by
definition of v∗s given in Proposition 1, we have vi ≥ c− s− µ4(v∗s). So that
µ4(v∗s) + vi − c+ s ≥ 0
We thus conclude that if condition (7) is satisfied then condition (6) will also be
satisfied.
Similarly, using the fact that vi for swing participants is such that vi ≤ v∗0, we
can show that if condition (8) is satisfied then condition (7) will also be satisfied.
This establishes the first two points of the lemma. The last point directly follows
using the fact that for the swing participants, the incentive to vote in favor of the
sanction is strictly increasing in vi (i.e the left hand side of condition (7) is increasing
in vi).
Proposition 3
The first result of Proposition 3 directly follows from Lemma 1 and using in
addition restriction A to guarantee that if a never participant (resp. always par-
ticipant) votes in favor, then all never participants (resp. always participant) with
higher types will vote in favor.
The second result directly follows from the derivations in the main text. For V <
v∗s , we have that R(V ) is constant and G(V ) is strictly increasing. An equilibrium
is characterized by the intersection of −R(V ) and G(V ). Thus, there is at most one
equilibrium where V ∗ < v∗s . The same reasoning applies for the always participants.
Proposition 4
We first show that under the conditions of Proposition 4, G(V ) is concave for
V ∈ (v∗s , v∗0). In this region, we have
G(V ) = 12e
[(





F (v∗0)−F (V )
1−F (V )
)]
Thus, the derivative is given by
G
′
(V ) = 12e
[(









Figure 4: Four possible outcomes
Looking at the second derivative, we have
G
′′
(V ) = 12e
[(





(1−F (v∗0))(1−F (V ))(−f ′(V )(1−F (V ))−2(f(V ))2)
(1−F (V ))4
)]
Thus, a sufficient condition to establish G
′′
(V ) < 0 is that
f ′(V )F (V )− 2(f(V ))2 ≤ 0 (9)
and
−f ′(V )(1− F (V ))− 2(f(V ))2 ≤ 0 (10)
This two conditions are implied by the conditions introduced in Proposition 3 namely
f
1−F (v) is weakly increasing implies condition 10 and
f
F (v) is weakly decreasing
implies condition 9 .
We thus establish that under these conditions, G(V ) is concave in V in the
interval (v∗s , v∗0). This implies that there are at most two perfect bayesian equilibria.
The four cases are illustrated in Figure 4.
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• Suppose G and −R intersect for V < v∗s and for v∗s < V < v∗0. By result 2 of
Proposition 3, there cannot be another intersection with V < v∗s . Moreover,
because of the concavity of G(V ), there cannot be another intersection for
V such that v∗s < V < v∗0. Finally there cannot then be an intersection with
V > v∗0 sinceG is decreasing on that interval whileR is linear and at v∗0 we have
G(v∗0) < R(v∗0). This corresponds to the case “Never participants+interior”
in Figure 4.
• Similar reasoning implies that if there is an intersection for V < v∗s and for V >
v∗0, then there cannot be an intersection for v∗s < V < v∗0. This corresponds to
the case “Never participants+always participants” in Figure 4.
• Similarly, if there are two intersections for v∗s < V < v∗0 there cannot be
another intersection. This corresponds to the case “2 interior cutoffs” in Figure
4.
• The last case is one where there are two intersections, one with v∗s < V <
v∗0 and one with V > v∗0. This corresponds to the case “Interior+always
participants” in Figure 4.
Proposition 5
We examine the case of interior equilibria (where V ∗ is the swing-participant
group). In this case V ∗ is implicitly defined by:
µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗0]) + V ∗ − c+G = 0










F (v∗0)− F (V ∗)
1− F (V ∗)
)]
= 0


























(F (V ∗))2 +
F (v∗)−1





∂s < 0 we have that V






∂E[vi|vi > v∗s ]
∂v∗s
< 0 (11)




1−F (v∗s )dv, we have
∂E[vi|vi > v∗s ]
∂v∗s
=








(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− v∗s)






(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− v∗s) (12)
When V ∗ < v∗s , the cutoff is defined by:
µ(E[vi|vi < v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗0]) +
e
2
F (v∗0)− F (v∗s)
1− F (V ∗) = 0
Similar computation shows that V ∗ is decreasing in s if and only if eµ > b¯(s)
with:
b¯(s) = 2
1− F (V ∗)
F (v∗s)
(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− v∗s)
Defining b(s) ≡ 2 F (V ∗)(1−F (v∗s )) (E[vi|vi > v
∗
s ]− v∗s), this establishes the result.
Proposition 6
We first consider the case where V ∗ belongs to the swing participant group.
As specified in the main text, when a supermajority of K votes is required to
pass the law, the indifference condition characterizing the cutoff is given by:






0)− F (V ∗)







= c− µ(E[vi|vi > v∗s ]− E[vi|vi < v∗0])
Considering K as a continuous variable, we can apply once again the implicit
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1 + e2N f(V
∗)
[
(2N −K) F (v∗s )






F (v∗0)− F (V ∗)
1− F (V ∗) −
F (V ∗)− F (v∗s)
F (V ∗)
]
Given that in stable equilibria, the denominator will be positive, we have that
∂V ∗
∂K is thus of the same sign as
F (V ∗)−F (v∗s )
F (V ∗) −
F (v∗0)−F (V ∗)
1−F (V ∗) , which is an increasing
function of V ∗, negative at v∗s and positive at v∗0. There is a unique value V̂ defined
by
F (V̂ )− F (v∗s)
F (V̂ )
=
F (v∗0)− F (V̂ )
1− F (V̂ ) (13)
such that for interior equilibria, if V ∗ ≤ V̂ , V ∗ is decreasing in K and the opposite
for V ∗ > V̂
Furthermore we have, as explained in the main text, that for V ∗ < v∗s , V ∗ is
decreasing in K, while equilibria such that V ∗ > v∗0 are not stable.
We thus have the result of the Proposition that there exists V̂ ∈ (v∗s , v∗0), with
V̂ defined by equation (13), such that the voting cutoff V ∗ is
• decreasing in K if V ∗ ≤ V̂
• increasing in K if V ∗ ≥ V̂
Lemma 2
For f uniform over (0, 1), we have that ∆(v) is constant, so that
v∗0 − v∗s = vˆs − vˆ0 (14)
Using equation (14), for V < v∗s




























the inequality derives from the fact that on this interval V < 12 .
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So that G(V ) = Ĝ(V )⇔ V = 12
The comparison of G(V ) and Ĝ(V ) is then symmetric for V > 12
Proposition 7
Lemma 2 establishes that for V < 12 , G(V ) is above Ĝ(V ). Changing the value
of e shifts G(V ) and Ĝ(V ) without affecting R or R̂. Thus for e not too high, G
an −R will intersect for lower values of V than Ĝ and −R̂, as visible in Figure 2.
If e is sufficiently high, so that Ĝ(0) > R̂(0), then the cutoff will be zero for the
both secret case. There is therefore an upper bound eh on e for the result to hold.
Similarly, if e is very low, the unique equilibrium in the secret vote environment is
for all types to vote against the sanction. There is therefore a lower bound el on e
for the result to hold.
Lemma 3
As stated in the main text, the incentive to vote in favor of the sanction is, for
the never participants, given by:
µ4∗ + P [Piv] (−s+G)
for swing participants
µ4∗ + P [Piv] (vi − c+G)
and for always participants
µ4∗ + P [Piv] (G)
The incentive is weakly increasing in vi. Restriction A then implies that all sym-
metric perfect equilibria are cutoff equilibria as in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 8
For all intervals, the indifference condition characterizing the equilibrium is of
the form
µ4∗ = P [Piv] Λ
where Λ can take different values depending on which interval the equilibrium be-
longs to.
An increase in N , for a given V ∗ decreases P [Piv]. Thus, if 4∗ is decreasing
in V ∗, we see that an increase in N will lead to an increase in V ∗ (i.e decrease in
probability of acceptance). This establishes the first result.
To establish the second result, we first show that the equilibrium where all types
vote against the sanction is not a sequential equilibrium. Indeed for all totally mixed
strategies, it has to be the case that E[v|bi = 1] − E[v|bi = 0] ≥ 0, because of the
cutoff property. So in all sequential equilibria, always participants will always have
an incentive to vote in favor of the sanction to benefit from the expected externality
and since a vote in favor cannot bring a bad reputation.
We now show that when N → +∞ the probability that there is a vote against
the sanction goes to zero.
Never participants are those who have the least incentives to vote in favor of the
sanction. In equilibrium, the net benefit of the never participants to vote in favor
of the sanction are given by:
µ [E[v|bi = 1]− E[v|bi = 0]] + P [Piv] (−s+G)
We have that −s + G is bounded and P [Piv] converges to zero, so that in
equilibrium, if some individuals vote against the sanction, it has to be the case that
[E[v|bi = 1] − E[v|bi = 0]] converges to zero. This implies that the proportion of
those voting against converges to zero.
Proposition 9
As indicated in the main text, in the public good stage, players will use cutoff
strategies conditional on their voting behavior in the first stage. There are therefore
two relevant cutoff: v0(0) and v0(1).
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Conditional on a particular equilibrium, denote Pp the probability that the sanc-
tion is adopted independently of individual i’s vote, Pr the probability that the
sanction is rejected independently of individual i’s vote, and Ppiv the probability
that the individual is pivotal. All these probabilities are independent of the player’s
actual type.
We also use the notation E0(b, a) = E [v|(bi = b) ∩ (ai = a) ∩ (s = 0)]. For in-
stance E0(1, 0) is the expected value of v given that the player voted for the sanction,
the sanction was not passed and he did not participate
Consider group members with vi < min(v0(0), v0(1)). If he votes in favor, his
expected benefit is:
Pp(µEs[1, 1] + vi − c+Gs) + Pr(µE0[1, 0] +G0) + Ppiv(µEs[1, 1] + vi − c+Gs)
where Gs (resp. G0) denotes as before the expected externality gain when the
sanction is passed (resp. not passed).
If the group member votes against, his expected benefit is:
Pp(µEs[0, 1] + vi − c+ eGs) + Pr(µE0[0, 0] + eG0) + Ppiv(µE0[0, 0] + eG0)
The net benefit of voting in favor for that individual is thus
D(vi) = Ppµ(Es[1, 1]− Es[0, 1]) + Prµ(E0[1, 0]− E0[0, 0]) + Ppiv(µ(Es[1, 1]− E0[0, 0]) + vi − c+G)
D(vi) is increasing in vi on that interval.
Similarly, if vi > max(v0(0), v0(1)), the net benefit of voting in favor is given by
D(vi) = Ppµ(Es[1, 1]− Es[0, 1]) + Prµ(E0[1, 1]− E0[0, 1]) + Ppiv(µ(Es[1, 1]− E0[0, 1]) +G)(15)
which is independent of vi.
We now consider the intermediate regions.
Suppose first v0(0) < v0(1) and consider the case v0(0) < vi < v0(1). Such a
group member participates when the sanction did not pass, if and only if he voted
against the sanction.
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If he votes in favor, his expected benefit is:
Pp(µEs[1, 1] + vi − c+Gs) + Pr(µE0[1, 0] +G0) + Ppiv(µEs[1, 1] + vi − c+Gs)
If he votes against, his expected benefit is:
Pp(µEs[0, 1] + vi − c+Gs) + Pr(µE0[0, 1] + vi − c+G0) + Ppiv(µE0[0, 1] + vi − c+ +G0)
The net benefit of voting in favor for that individual is thus
D(vi) = Ppµ(Es[1, 1]− Es[0, 1]) + Pr(µ(E0[1, 0]− E0[0, 1])− (vi − c))
+ Ppiv(µ(Es[1, 1]− E0[0, 1]) +G)
D(vi) is then decreasing in vi on that interval.
Suppose on the contrary that v0(1) < v0(0) and consider types with v0(1) <
vi < v0(0), then the net benefit of voting in favor for that individual is thus
D(vi) = Ppµ(Es[1, 1]− Es[0, 1]) + Prµ(E0[1, 1]− E0[0, 0] + (vi − c))
+ Ppiv(µ(Es[1, 1]− E0[0, 0]) + (vi − c) +G)
which is increasing in vi
Consider case A: v0(1) < v0(0).
In this case as shown above, if we impose restriction A as before,the voting
strategy is a cutoff strategy with cutoff V ∗ since the net benefit function D(vi) is
weakly increasing in vi on all intervals and continuous. There are three situations
• V ∗ < v0(1) then there are three zones with respective outcomes (0,0), (1,0)
and (1,1)
• v0(1) < V ∗ < v0(0) with two zones: (0,0) and (1,1)
• V ∗ > v0(0) with three zones (0,0), (0,1) and (1,1)
We now check whether these equilibria are compatible with the condition v0(1) <
v0(0). We have
v0(0) = c− µ(E[0, 1]− E[0, 0])
v0(1) = c− µ(E[1, 1]− E[1, 0])
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Figure 5: Comparing the cases both secret and secret vote
So that v0(1) < v0(0) is equivalent to:
E[1, 1]− E[1, 0] > E[0, 1]− E[0, 0] (16)
Only that values E[1, 1], E[0, 0] and E[1, 0] (in the second equilibrium) are pinned
down in equilibrium, and thus E[0, 1] can be chosen low enough to guarantee that
condition (16) is satisfied.
Consider case B: v0(0) < v0(1). In this case as shown above, the voting strategy
is no longer necessarily a cutoff strategy since the net benefit curve D(vi) first in-
creases in vi then decreases. There are then potentially three cases for an equilibrium
with some types voting in favor and some against.
Consider the case e = 0, then there exists a value of µ such that D(vi) intersects
the zero line twice and you thus have outcomes (0,0) for low values of vi, outcomes
(1,0) for intermediate values and (0,1) for high values, as indicated in the result of
the Proposition. This is represented in case 1 in Figure 5.
Suppose now that D(vi) intersects the zero line once for v < v0(0) (case 2 in
Figure 5). Agents will then choose (0,0) for low values, (1,0) for intermediate values
and (1,1) for high values.
Finally, if D(vi) intersects the zero line once for v0(0) < v < v0(1) (case 3 in
Figure 5), there are four zones (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1).
Note furthermore that the condition v0(0) < v0(1) is equivalent to
E[1, 1]− E[1, 0] < E[0, 1]− E[0, 0] (17)




Consider the contribution stage and fix the contributions a−i of other group
members. If individual i contributes, he gets,
vi − c+ µE[vi|a = 1] + eg(1, a−i)
Not contributing yields
−s+ µE[vi|a = 0] + eg(0, a−i)
So contribution behavior is going to be characterized by a cutoff, as in the main
model. However, the exact determination of the cutoff is more involved for two
reasons. First, a−i, the contribution of others, is an equilibrium choice and thus a
function of the equilibrium cutoff. Second, the outcome of the vote in the first phase,
gives information about the distribution of types in the population and therefore
affects the expectation of a−i. We restrict our attention to cases where only the
aggregate result of the vote is revealed.
In spite of these differences, the results of Proposition 1 and 3 are preserved. In
particular the shape of the equilibrium is unaffected.
Proposition 10 • For the case of substitutes, if 1 + µ4′(v) > 0 and e < e˜,
the contribution stage is characterized by two cutoffs v˜0 > v˜s such that group
member i contributes if and only if vi > v˜0 if there is no sanction and vi > v˜s
with a sanction.
• For the case of complements, if 1+µ4′(v) > 0 and e < e˜, there exists a bound 
such that if ∂(g(1,a−i)−g(0,a−i))∂aj < , then the contribution stage is characterized
by two cutoffs v˜0 > v˜s such that group member i contributes if and only if
vi > v˜0 if there is no sanction and vi > v˜s with a sanction.
• Under Restriction A, all symmetric perfect bayesian equilibria are cutoff equi-
libria at the voting stage.
Proof
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The aggregate result of the vote (pass or fail), allows the group members to
update on the type distribution. We denote fs(v) the updated belief over the types
of other group members (vector v of size 2N) given that the sanction was passed in
the first phase and f0(v) the updated belief given that the sanction was rejected.
Consider the case where the sanction was adopted. Not contributing yields
vi − c+ µE[vi|a = 1] + eEs[g(1, a∗−i)]
Not contributing yields







is the expected value of the public good, given belief fs over types and given that
the relation in equilibrium between type and action, a∗j (vj).
The net incentive to vote in favor is thus given by:






So the contribution behavior is going to be characterized by a cutoff. The cutoff is
defined by:




−i)|v∗s ]− Es[g(0, a∗−i)|v∗s ]
)
= 0
where a∗−i depends on the cutoff v
∗
s used in equilibrium.















−i)|v∗s ] depends on s through the changes in fs. The numerator is thus
negative, provided e is low enough.
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The denominator is given by:











< 0. In the case of substitutes ∂(Es[g(1,a−i)]−Es[g(0,a−i)])∂aj < 0 so the
condition 1 + µ4′(v) > 0 is sufficient to guarantee that the overall ∂v∗s∂s < 0.
For the case of complements ∂(Es[g(1,a−i)]−Es[g(0,a−i)])∂aj > 0, so the extra constraint
is required to guarantee that the left hand side is increasing:
∂ (g(1, a−i)− g(0, a−i)])
∂aj
< 
This establishes the first two results of the Proposition.
So in the second stage the same three categories emerge as in our main model:
never-participants, swing-participants and always-participants. The same deriva-
tions as those used for Lemma 1 apply, in particular the calculations in equations
(2), (3), (4). The only difference involves the calculation of G, but since G is identical
for all groups, Lemma 1 and the first result of Proposition 3 follow directly.
B2: changing supermajority rule
We present a particular exemple where the sanction is more likely to be imple-
mented when we increase the supermajority requirement.
We consider a case where the type distribution f is a uniform distribution on
(0,1) and we restrict our attention to a group with 3 members. Participation cutoffs
simplify to
v0 = c− µ
2
vs = c− µ
2
− s
We use the following parameters: c = 3, s = 0.5, µ = 4 and e = 1.5. It implies
that v0 = 1 and vs = 0.5. All yes voters are swing participants.








) + V ∗ − c+ 1
2
e× [V − vs
V
+ 1] = 0
Plugging the parameters, the voting cutoff that satisfies this equation is V2 '
0.91.
Because of the simple majority assumption, the probability that the sanction is
accepted is:
P (sanction is accepted) = P (3 votes for) + P (2 votes for)
= (1− V2)3 + V2 × (1− V2)2 × 3
' 0.02
Now suppose that unanimity is required. If a voter is pivotal, the other two
must have voted for the sanction and thus are swing participants. If he votes for,







) + V ∗ + e = 0
And the voting cutoff is the smallest possible interior cutoff: V3 = vs = 0.5.
This cutoff is much smaller than before because in our example, being pivotal when
unanimity is required increases a lot the expected externality gain.
As a result, we have:
P (sanction is accepted) = P (3 votes for)
= (1− V3)3
= 18
Overall, the sanction is more likely to be implemented when we increase the
supermajority in this example.
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